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Implications of Anderson v. Christopherson on the Interpretation of Minnesota Dog Bite Cases |
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A recent Minnesota Court of Appeals case, Anderson v. Christopherson, No. A11-191, 2011 WL 3426174 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2011), will change the way Minnesota courts interpret liability under the dog-owner liability statute, Minn. Stat. § 374.22. Under this law, a dog owner (which includes anyone “harboring” or “keeping” a dog) can be found strictly liable if his or her dog “without provocation, attacks or injures any person who is peaceably in any place where the person may lawfully be.”
On September 27, 2009, Gordon Anderson was walking his dog, Tuffy, past Dennis Christopherson’s house. As the two walked past the home, Bruno, a dog owned by Mr. Christopherson’s son, Neil, picked Tuffy up in his jaws and would not release him. While Anderson was attempting to separate the dogs, he fell and broke his hip.
Anderson brought suit against Dennis and Neil Christopherson under claims of negligence and strict liability pursuant to the dog-owner’s liability statute, Minn. Stat. § 374.22. The district court relied on the holding in an earlier dog bite case, Mueller v. Theis, which held that in order for the statute to apply, the dog’s conduct must be “focused” on the injured party. 512 N.W.2d 909 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994), review denied (Minn. Apr. 28, 1994). Accordingly, the district court found that, as a matter of law, Minn. Stat. § 374.22 did not apply because Bruno’s focus was on Tuffy, instead of Anderson.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals confronted two issues: whether Bruno’s exclusive focus on Tuffy at the time of the attack prohibited the application of the dog-owner’s liability statute and whether Dennis Christopherson was “harboring” Bruno within the interpretation of the law.
The Court first examined the changes in Minnesota case law regarding dog bite liability, starting with the interpretation of the phrase “attacks or injures.” In Boitz v. Preblich, the Court of Appeals reversed a decision that had found in favor of a man who broke his wrist when a dog bumped into him. 405 N.W.2d 907 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). Specifically, the Boitz Court held that the phrase “attacks or injures” in the statute means that injuries caused by a dog “outside the scope of a vicious attack” warrants protection under the law.
Under that rationale, the Court of Appeals determined that in this case, the dog-owner’s liability statute may apply to situations where a dog injures a person who was not the focus of the dog’s actions. The Court based its decision, in part, on the argument that relying on a dog’s “focus” introduced a subjective element into the strict liability statute which would warrant an analysis of determining where the dog was directing his or her attention at the time of the attack. The Court specifically noted that it “disagree[s] with the language in Mueller [v. Theis, 512 N.W.2d 907 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994)] that arguably added a requirement that the dog must also be “focused” on the injured person in order for the person’s injuries to be the direct and immediate result of the dog’s conduct.” In addition, the Court concluded that the phrase “or injures” in the statute negated the requirement that a dog must always be focused on the injured party. Rather, by including this phrase in the statute, the Court noted that the legislature intended the law to include a “dog’s affirmative but nonattacking behavior which injures a person who is immediately implicated by such nonhostile behavior.” (Citing Lewellin v. Huber, 465 N.W.2d 62, 64 (Minn. 1991)).
The Court then analyzed whether Christopherson would be relieved of liability because the chain of events between the dog’s actions and the injury was too attenuated, as articulated in Lewellin. The Court held that in this case, the chain of events connecting Bruno’s behavior to Anderson’s injury was an affirmative act that prompted Anderson’s response which, in turn, immediately resulted in his injury. Because the ultimate question in this case now turned on a question of fact—the proximate cause of Anderson’s injury—the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district court to determine whether Anderson’s injury was the “direct and immediate result” of Bruno’s behavior.
In addition, the Court concluded that the district court’s reliance on definitions of “harboring” and “keeping” where inaccurate interpretations of the terms. Consequently, it also remanded to the district court the question of whether Dennis Christopherson could be considered to be “harboring” or “keeping” Bruno within the meaning of the law.
This decision signals a change in the way Minnesota courts may decide dog bite cases going forward. Now, the scenarios under which dog owners (or anyone considered to be “keeping” or “harboring” a dog) are found liable for injuries related to their dogs may now be much broader under Minnesota law. Arguably, even with a much friendlier dog than Tuffy—one who does not even attack or otherwise “focus on” a person—could create liability under the dog-owner liability statute.
If you have questions concerning this recent Court of Appeals decision or dog bite law in Minnesota, please contact Dyan Ebert or Garin Strobl at
Quinlivan & Hughes, P.A. law firm at (320) 251-1414, (800) 325-5650,
or e-mail them at debert@quinlivan.com and gstrobl@quinlivan.com.
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